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Abstract
Background: The disparity between government health expenditures across regions is more severe in developing
countries than it is in developed countries. The capitation subsidy method has been proven effective in developed
countries in reducing this disparity, but it has not been tested in China, the world’s largest developing country.
Methods: The convergence method of neoclassical economics was adopted to test the convergence of China’s
regional government health expenditure. Data were obtained from Provinces, Prefectures and Counties Fiscal
Statistical Yearbook (2003–2007) edited by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, and published by the Chinese Finance
& Economics Publishing House.
Results: The existence of σ-convergence and long-term and short-term β-convergence indicated the effectiveness
of the capitation subsidy method in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme on narrowing county government
health expenditure disparities. The supply-side variables contributed the most to the county government health
expenditure convergence, and factors contributing to convergence of county government health expenditures per
capita were different in three regions.
Conclusion: The narrowing disparity between county government health expenditures across regions supports the
effectiveness of the capitation subsidy method adopted by China’s New Rural Cooperative Scheme. However, subsidy
policy still requires further improvement.
Keywords: Government health expenditure, Capitation, Convergence, County
Abbreviations: CPI, Consumer Price Index; GHE, Government Health Expenditures; GIS, Government Employee
Insurance System; NCMS, New Cooperative Medical Scheme; NHS, National Health Service
Background
At the 2005 World Health Assembly, all member states
committed to achieving the goal of universal health cover-
age [1]. As is known, the most effective and equitable way
to achieve universal health coverage is through obligatory
funding such as taxation or social health insurance [2].
However, this requires allocating the raised funds equit-
ably across regions. Both developed and developing coun-
tries to some extent face regional government health
expenditure (GHE) disparities [3–5]. Health expenditure
budgets, if based on historical expenditures or by govern-
ment negotiation, enlarge the existing inequity, capitation
subsidy is more effective in eliminating the disparity [6].
Capitation subsidy is defined as “the contribution to a
plan’s budget associated with a plan member for the ser-
vice in question for a given period of time.” Previous stud-
ies on the association between capitation subsidies and
regional GHE equity mainly focus on developed countries.
The WHO has reviewed the current formulas on the
allocation of public funds to health expenditures in devel-
oped countries as well as the experiences and lessons from
the practices of low-and-middle income countries [7].
England and Sweden have been exploring how to use
weighted capitation subsidy methods to achieve equitable
resource allocation, and their research has offered
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guidance for other countries [8]. Capitation subsidy
methods have proven effective in improving the equity of
GHE in developed countries [6, 7], but how effective have
they been in developing countries? What are the influen-
cing factors if capitation subsidy methods are used in
developing countries? Some research has been conducted
in developing countries, but this study explores the effect-
iveness and primary influencing factors of capitation
subsidies on regional GHE equity in China, the world’s
largest developing country.
The existing literatures on capitation subsidy in China
have focused on regional equity of GHE. Chou & Wang
analyzed the health expenditures of 28 provinces in
China from 1978 to 2004, and found cluster convergence
among regions with similar conditions, but no single
convergence among provinces [9]. Pay et.al studied the
equity of provincial GHE from 1997 to 2009, and found
long-term convergence of GHE among provinces [10].
However, none of these studies has analyzed the impact
of the change of allocation methods on regional equity.
Furthermore, the analysis units have restricted to the
provincial level, so the massive disparities among
counties1 and within provinces have been neglected.
From 1990s to the early 2000s, regional inequality of
health expenditures in China was severe. For instance,
GHE per capita of several poor counties was less than 5
Yuan (1 US$ = 8.3 Yuan in 2003), while in other rich
counties, it was over 200 Yuan. The disparity was caused
by financing and allocation methods of county GHE
before 2003. The majority of the county GHE came from
county fiscal revenue; part was also from subsidies from
superior governments (central, provincial and prefectural
levels). Therefore, the local economic development and
tax sharing system contributed to the disparity of county
GHE per capita.
In China, regional economic development is imbalanced
and the disparities are obvious. For example, in 2003,
annual GDP per capita in the developed Southeastern
coastal areas reached 50,000 Yuan, however the figure for
undeveloped Central and Western areas remained less
than 1000 Yuan. These more developed counties normally
have higher county fiscal revenues. Meanwhile, the tax
sharing system in China is designed to collect more fis-
cal revenues for higher-level government, and leave less
to the county governments [11]. The transfer payment
system primarily consists of upward and downward
transfers between county governments and their super-
ior government. Though the upward transfer allows the
superior government to draw more funds from rich
counties than the poor ones, the subsidy or distribution
given by the superior government to county govern-
ments does not promote the equalization of county fis-
cal revenues. Instead, it enlarges the regional disparities
of county fiscal revenues [12].
The grants appropriated to public service sectors are
budgeted based on past actual expenditures [13]. As to
the county GHE allocated from county fiscal revenue, the
annual budget increased proportionally on the basis of
local health expenditures in the previous years. This
allocation method accepts the reasonability of previous
years’ GHE, but does not improve regional GHE equity.
For transfer payments, the GHE subsidies from the
superior governments are commonly directed as ear-
marked grants. The county governments have to com-
pete for the limited funds, and will ultimately receive the
appropriations through negotiations with the superior
governments [14]. Because the developed regions have
more political influence, the earmarked grants, except
for those specifically assigned to the poverty-stricken
counties, are usually appropriated to the developed
regions, rather than to the developing regions. In other
words, this allocation method may have been contribut-
ing to the county GHE disparity.
In addition to the massive regional GHE disparities,
government investment in the health sector is also
insufficient. The proportion of general GHE in China has
dropped from 38.7 % in 1986 to 15.7 % in 2002. Mean-
while, the proportion of out-of-pocket health expenditures
has increased significantly, from 26.4 % in 1986 to 57.7 %
in 2002. To cope with the challenges, the Chinese govern-
ment began to increase health investment in 2003, marked
by the establishment of the New Cooperative Medical
Scheme (NCMS) [15, 16].
NCMS, the health insurance scheme designed exclu-
sively for Chinese rural residents, is administered by the
county governments and financed jointly by governments
and rural residents. As opposed to previous supply-side
investments, the government switched to subsidizing de-
mand. By doing so, the allocation method of the new fund
was improved, and the NCMS fund was subsidized ac-
cording to the number of enrollees. The NCMS financing
policies released by the central government in 2003 stipu-
lated that the governments must guarantee at least a 20
Yuan fiscal subsidy for each insured, and encourage all
regions to invest more to satisfy the healthcare demands
of rural residents. The undeveloped regions with lower
fiscal revenues and more rural residents may undergo
significant GHE increase. Yet, GHE in developed regions
with fewer rural residents may experience a slower
increase. Therefore, we would expect a narrowed GHE
gap among county governments. In other words, the shift
in allocation methods of the new fund from the traditional
method to the capitation subsidy would significantly
improve the equity of regional GHE in China.
Framework
GHE per capita accounting for equity of health financing
is affected by many factors. There are four approaches
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which influence how much governments spend on
health [17]. The peer pressure approach recommends
the amount of GHE for a government according to other
governments with similar characteristics such as income
or epidemiological profile. The political economy approach
believes that health spending is influenced by the interplay
of political and economic forces which determine budget
priorities. The production function approach estimates
changes in health spending based on health status after
controlling other factors such as socioeconomic character-
istics and demographics. The budget approach generates
estimates of health spending through identifying health
service demand and the price of health services.
Given a uniform tax rate for local governments, the
disparities in healthcare services among local govern-
ments with different revenue levels would grow without
national redistribution. All health systems need to allo-
cate public funds to health plans in local government to
fulfill their tasks in line with health policy. Five methods
are usually used in budgeting public funds with govern-
ment health expenditures included: (1) distribution ori-
ginating from political patronage; (2) distribution based
on historical precedent; (3) allocation by bids submitted
by localities, or contingent on some measure of local
performance; (4) expenditures localities actually spend;
(5) allocation by mathematical formula [18]. The capita-
tion subsidy method is the major approach of formula
funding.
The capitation subsidy method may lead to more
equitable allocation outcomes than the others. It consists
of entities in reception of funds, health service benefit
packages, number of people covered and risk adjustment
[4]. By using the capitation subsidy method, the central
government determines the scale of a grant received by
health a plan in a local government according to the ex-
pected health service activities, as measured by the size
and characteristics of the population in a locality [3, 4].
In actuality, the capitation subsidy method allocates a
fixed budget to health plans in local governments based
on population. This is more equitable than the other
four methods.
In general, the capitation subsidy method allocates
funds to health plans in local governments according to
supply-side factors such as general revenues and grants,
as well as demand-side factors such as demographics [5].
This is done in order to equalize the GHE in local gov-
ernments and to reach health financing equity. Accord-
ing to the capitation subsidy method specifically, the
historical GHE level, government general revenue, grants
to county governments, transfers to superior the govern-
ment, population density, sex ratio, and ratio of non-
agricultural population were included in this research to
test their influence on the delta of GHE per capita. We
are not only concerned about whether or not the
regional disparity decreases, but also the conditions and
factors that narrowed the gap. The analysis of these




The Chinese government is divided into 5 levels— central,
provincial, prefecture, county and township. In China’s
healthcare system, the county government takes funda-
mental responsibility for providing healthcare services in
rural areas. Due to large regional disparities, the county
GHE is the most accurate representation of the equity of
Chinese GHE, compared with the GHE of other govern-
ment levels. In 2003, the capitation subsidy method was
used to allocate fiscal directions to NCMS funds. This
allocation method was also adopted by Urban Residents
Basic Medical Insurance when it was established in 2007.
Therefore, we used the panel data on county GHE
from 2003 to 2007 to estimate the effect of capitation
subsidies on narrowing county GHE disparities.
Between 2003 and 2007, there were 2861, 2862, 2862,
2860, and 2859 counties in China respectively. A total of
1941 counties were included in this study for the 5
consecutive years from 2003 to 2007, after excluding
counties with missing values. The 9705 samples were
subordinate to 31 provinces (including 22 provinces, 4
municipalities and 5 autonomous regions; Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macau were excluded). The fiscal revenues
and GHE of the counties were extracted from Provinces,
Prefectures and Counties Fiscal Statistical Yearbooks
(quan guo di shi xian cai zheng tong ji zi liao) (2003–
2007), edited by the Chinese Ministry of Finance, and
published by the Chinese Finance& Economic Publishing
House2; population figures were obtained from the
China Population Statistical Yearbook (2004–2008); the
geographic area of each county was obtained from the
China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 2001,
and the consumer price index (CPI) was obtained from
the China Statistical Yearbook (2004–2008). It should be
noted that the data used in our study is household regis-
tration population, not resident population at the end of
year. This is consistent with the NCMS capitation sub-
sidy method in terms of household registration popula-
tion. All yearbooks and data are publicly available in
electronic and text format, and can be accessed from
university libraries such as the Sun Yat-sen University
Library.
Variables and measurement
County GHE accounts for a large percentage of total
government health expenditures, and is usually measured
by GHE per capita. In this study, the control variables
were categorized into demand-side and supply-side. The
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supply-side variables referred to the factors restricting
county GHE, including the local government’s general rev-
enue, grants from higher-level governments and transfers
from county government to higher-level governments.
Given the capitation subsidy method used in NCMS, the
rural resident population was also an important variable.
Since the contributions to NCMS funds from higher level
governments could not be separated from the general
subsidies, we used general subsidy to represent subsidies
to NCMS funds in this study. We also included two
demand-side variables: sex ratio and population density.
County GHE, general revenue, grants and transfers were
divided by the county population to get the per capita
values. They were then deflated by using the consumer
price index (CPI), with 2003 as the base year. The rural
resident population was conversely measured by the
formula 1 - agricultural population/total population,
namely proportion of non-agricultural population, which
reveals more straightforwardly the fast urbanization
progress in China. Population density was calculated using
population and geographic area, and sex ratio calculated
as female population divided by the total population.
Models
The disparity of regional GHE should be eliminated if the
capitation subsidy method is effective. The σ-convergence
model and β-convergence model are widely used to verify
the changing tendency of regional economic disparity
[19], and to test the hypothesis of the narrowing regional
healthcare expenditure disparities [20]. Therefore, we
tested the existence of σ-convergence and β-convergence
of county GHE over time.
The concept of σ-convergence in neoclassical econom-
ics was initially defined as the tendency of dispersion of
GDP per capita in a group of countries that declined
over time [21]. In this study, σ-convergence indicated
the declining tendency of dispersion of annual county
GHE per capita from 2003 to 2007. It was measured by
the coefficient of variation (CV) of county GHE per
capita and the standard deviation(SD) of log county
GHE per capita [20]. An F-test was used to verify the
significance of convergence of CV and SD at the level of
5 % [22]. The models are showed as follows:
CVtþ1 < CVt ð1Þ
SDtþ1 < SDt ð2Þ
β-convergence was defined to demonstrate the faster
economic growth of poor countries than rich countries.
In this study, it represented the situation in which coun-
ties with lower initial GHE per capita in 2003 created
faster growth rates than those with higher initial levels.
The influencing factors on β-convergence are discussed
as well. Baumol’s Conditional Convergence Model was
adopted to test β-convergence (see formula 3) [23]. yi,t
was i county’s (i = 1,2,…,1941) logarithm of county GHE
per capita in the year t (t = 2003,…,2007). Δyi, t+k was the
delta of the logarithm of county GHE per capita of
county i during t + k period, and k was the time intervals
(k = 1, 4). xi, t referred to the vector of variables exerting
influence on convergence including general revenue per
capita, grant per capita, transfer per capita, ratio of non-
agricultural population, sex ratio and population density.
If xi, t was excluded, the formula (3) referred to absolute
β-convergence. If the value of β was negative, it was
equal to the existence of absolute β-convergence and
conditional β-convergence.
Δyi;tþk ¼ αþ β yi;t þ γ xi;t þ εi;t ð3Þ
Results
Descriptive analysis
A total of 1941 counties were included in the analysis
(883 were excluded due to missing values). Mean and
SD of each variable from 2003 to 07 were reported (see
Table 1). The mean of GHE per capita, general revenue
per capita, grants to county government per capita, and
transfer to superior government per capita all increased
from 2003 to 07: GHE per capita increased from 36.1952
Yuan in 2003 to 86.4012 Yuan in 2007, general revenue
per capita from 339.3767 Yuan to 666.5741 Yuan, grants
to county government per capita from 514.1106 Yuan to
1002.1680 Yuan, and transfer to superior government
per capita from 69.6369 Yuan to 107.4491 Yuan. How-
ever, their SDs were large, exposing the disparities in
health expenditures and fiscal revenues among counties.
The ratio of non-agricultural population, population
density and the sex ratio were also analyzed (see
Table 1).
σ-convergence
The changing tendency of SD and CV of county GHE
per capita of 1941 counties from 2003 to 2007 is shown
in Fig. 1. The SD of log county GHE per capita increased
from 0.3197 to 0.3378 from 2003 to 2004, and then de-
clined. CV showed a similar tendency. The convergence
of county GHE per capita appeared beginning in 2005.
The geographic distribution of the SD of Chinese
county GHE per capita in 2003 and 2007 was analyzed
with GIS mapping (see Fig. 2). The darker color, the
larger SD. Fewer “dark-color counties” were shown in
the 2007 map than in the 2003 map, indicating the
shrinking disparity of county GHE.
An F-test was used to further test the convergence of
SD and CV in county GHE. From 2005 onward, the SD
of annual county GHE per capita was significantly less
than that of the previous year, confirming the convergence
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(see Table 2). The test results of CV of county GHE per
capita were similar to those of SD. To summarize, σ-
convergence existed in Chinese county GHE from 2003 to
2007, indicating the success of NCMS the capitation
subsidy method in narrowing regional disparities. During
the initial period of NCMS implementation (2003–2004),
the capitation subsidy method did not exert obvious
effects, however it did show significant effects after 2005.
β-convergence
In this study, 1941 counties were divided into 3 regions
(East, Central and West) according to definitions given
by the China National Bureau of Statistics. The scatter
diagrams manifested the relationship of initial county
GHE per capita in 2003, as well as the GHE per capita
growth rate during the period from 2003 to 2007 (see
Fig. 3). All four diagrams showed the negative correl-
ation both in the 3 separate regions and nationwide.
Counties with lower initial county GHE per capita had
faster growth rates than those with higher initial levels.
The preliminary observation of the scatter diagram sug-
gested the existence of β-convergence.
According to time intervals (k = 1, 4) and convergence
types (absolute β-convergence and conditional β-
convergence), we established 4 statistical models to test
β-convergence: (see Table 3) (1) short-term absolute β-
convergence, (2) short-term conditional β-convergence,
(3) long-term absolute β-convergence and (4) long-term
conditional β-convergence. The coefficient of GHE per
capita was significantly negative at the level of 0.1 % in
all models, suggesting the existence of long-term and
short-term β-convergence. The marginal effect of GHE
per capita on regional disparity reduction was 9.88,
24.10, 35.50 and 54.50 % respectively from model (1) to
model (4). The findings indicated that the counties with
lower initial GHE levels not only had higher growth rates
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of variables, 2003–07
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
n = 1941 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
GHE per capita 36.1952 40.8757 45.4861 57.7739 86.4012
(37.8421) (80.6142) (58.6031) (58.0162) (78.8955)
General revenue per capita 339.3767 408.3899 486.4796 572.7846 666.5741
(440.2193) (770.6048) (815.8008) (887.2564) (1039.1240)
Grants to county government per capita 514.1106 624.0676 728.7735 862.1478 1002.1680
(568.4750) (923.0494) (1251.0640) (1020.3660) (1240.1550)
Transfer to superior government per capita 69.6369 77.1887 90.9634 101.5136 107.4491
(153.2010) (213.9685) (277.5415) (365.3951) (408.1884)
Ratio of non-agriculture population 0.2868 0.2989 0.3069 0.3106 0.3133
(0.2620) (0.2895) (0.3054) (0.2755) (0.2746)
Population density 906.0498 935.8068 932.6604 940.5806 951.6450
(2830.4420) (3043.4190) (2915.0320) (2899.6320) (2925.2370)
Sex ratio 0.4837 0.4839 0.4839 0.4842 0.4844
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0109)
Fig. 1 σ-convergence of county-level GHE per capita in China (2003–2007)
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than those with higher initial level, but also contributed
more to the reduction of regional GHE disparity.
The supply-side variables were analyzed first. In model
(2) and (4), the coefficients of general budget revenues
and of grants to county government were significantly
positive at the level of 0.1 %, indicating that the two
factors enlarged the county GHE per capita disparity.
Grants to county government were commonly designed
to promote regional equalization, but the results in our
study showed a reverse effect. This finding alerted us
that China’s fiscal subsidy policy needed improvement.
The coefficients of transfer to superior government and
of ratio of non-agriculture population were significantly
negative at the level of 0.1 % in the long-term, suggest-
ing its effectiveness in reducing the disparity of county
GHE per capita. Transfer to the superior government
reduced county fiscal revenue disparities, and therefore
reduced the county GHE per capita disparity. Ratio of
non-agriculture population, representing the level of
urbanization, also contributed to the reduction of the
county GHE per capita disparity.
For the demand-side variables, population density in-
creased county GHE per capita disparities at the level of
5 % in the short-term and, at the level of 0.1 % in the
long-term, but with a weak marginal effect. The effect of
sex ratio was not statistically significant. In general,
during 2003–2007, the supply-side factors contributed
more to county GHE per capita disparities than did the
demand factors.
Below is the analysis of regional disparities of county
GHE per capita in Eastern, Central and Western China
(see Table 4). The coefficients of county GHE per capita
in the 3 regions were all significantly negative at the
0.1 % level, indicating the existence of β-convergence
among regions. The findings were consistent with the
nation-level analysis.
For the supply-side variables, general budget revenue
did not significantly influence the intra-regional county
GHE per capita disparity in the West, but it did enlarge
it in the Central and Eastern regions. Grants to county
government enlarged intra-regional county GHE per
capita disparity in all regions, which again confirmed the
necessity of improving China’s fiscal subsidy policy.
Transfer to superior governments exerted a complicated
effect. In the Western regions, it significantly reduced
the county GHE per capita disparity in the short-term,
but did not exert long-term influence. Transfer contrib-
uted significantly to the elimination of the county GHE
Fig. 2 Distribution of SD of county-level GHE per capita in China in 2003 and 2007
Table 2 σ-convergence and F-test
Year SD of Log GHE F-value CV of GHE F-value
2003 0.3197 — 1.0455 —
2004 0.3378 0.8956 1.9722 0.281
2005 0.3289* 1.0552 1.2884* 2.3432
2006 0.3083* 1.1376 1.0042* 1.6461
2007 0.2520* 1.4976 0.9131* 1.2094
Note: F-test for SD (Microsoft Excel 2007 software), =SDt-1
2 /SDt
2, where t-1
(t = 2004, …, 2007) is the base year, and t is the year under test. The null
hypothesis is SDt-1
2 ≤ SDt
2. The F-test for CV is the same. * is significance at 5 %.
SD and CV refer to standard deviation and coefficient of variation, respect-
ively. GHE is the abbreviation of government health expenditure
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per capita disparity in the East, but did not work in
Central China.
The ratio of non-agricultural population showed
significant long-term influence on county GHE per
capita disparity in all three regions at the level of 0.1 %,
but the short-term influence was only observed in the
Eastern region. Among demand-side variables, popula-
tion density raised county GHE per capita disparity only
in the East, while sex ratio did not show significant
influence in any of the three regions.
To summarize, β-convergence of county GHE per
capita existed in all three regions of China. Each region
was influenced by different influencing factors, and more
factors contributed to county GHE per capita disparity
in the Eastern region than in the Central and Western
regions. We also used a mixed regression model, a ran-
dom effects model, and a fixed effects model to test the
significance of the results in the short-term models, as
well as a robust regression to test the significance of the
results in the long-term models. The results of explain-
ing convergence of GHE per capita with these variables
was robust, but the results of the robust check are not
presented in the table due to space limitations.
Discussion
Tendency analysis and an F-test showed fast σ-
convergence of county GHE since 2005, indicating the
effectiveness of the capitation subsidy method adopted
by NCMS, and the success in narrowing the disparities
of county GHE per capita. NCMS was piloted in 2003 in
approximately 100 counties, and the government subsi-
dized 20 Yuan for each insured. In 2007, NCMS were
established in 2452 counties, serving 726 million
(86.20 %) rural residents. The government subsidies then
increased to 60 Yuan per capita, accounting for 60 % of
GHE per capita. The increasing government subsidies
Fig. 3 GHE per capita in 2003 and annual growth rate of GHE per capita from 2003 to 2007. Figure (a) presents all counties in China, and (b, c, d)
presents the counties in the West, Central, and Eastern regions of China, respectively
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and NCMS coverage not only increased the county
GHE, but also promoted the equalization of county
GHE per capita.
Previous studies have argued that the convergence was
caused by the switch from subsidizing the supply-side to
subsidizing the demand-side [16]. However, our study
argues that the switch itself did not automatically lead to
GHE per capita convergence. The capitation subsidy
method is the real power that promotes the elimination of
regional GHE disparity, regardless of which side the gov-
ernment subsidizes. For example, China’s government em-
ployee insurance system (GIS) subsidizes the demand-side
via a fee-for-service method that leads to large regional
disparities of GIS medical expense per capita. National
Health Service (NHS) in the U.K. uses the capitation
subsidy method to subsidize the supply-side, and regional
disparities in GHE per capita are limited.
Both β-convergence and σ-convergence analysis
showed similar tendencies of convergence of county
GHE per capita in the short-term and the long-term.
This indicates that the capitation subsidy method in
NCMS has rapidly reduced disparities of county GHE
per capita. Furthermore, it shows that counties with
lower initial spending levels had faster growth rates in
county GHE per capita than the counties with higher
initial spending levels.
As an aspect of county fiscal investment in NCMS
funds, the policies set out the lowest appropriation levels
and encouraged the richer counties to invest more. The
general revenue significantly enlarged the disparity of
county GHE per capita, which indicates that the devel-
oped areas allocate more health expenditures to their
residents. The results of our study support the widely-
acknowledged viewpoint that health expenditures are both
a national luxury and an individual necessity [24, 25].
The subsidies from higher-level governments only
enlarged county GHE per capita disparities. This analysis
coincides with previous studies, and indicates that China’s
grant policies need immediate improvement [12]. As for
the subsidies to NCMS funds, in 2003, the central govern-
ment subsidized 10 Yuan per year for each insured in the
less-developed Central and Western China (except muni-
cipal districts), and the local governments were required
to subsidize no less than 10 Yuan. However, in the devel-
oped Eastern China (e.g., Guangdong Province), the
central government did not offer any subsidies. However,
subsidization based on geographic regions (East, Central,
and West) may neglect intra-regional disparity, as it did
not contribute to improving GHE equity among counties.
The central government indirectly subsidizes the counties
in the Central and Western regions based on provincial
general revenues according to NCMS policy. This policy
neglects the intra-provincial distinctions among counties,
and therefore enlarges the disparity of county GHE per
capita. The central government should directly subsidize
NCMS funds based on county general fiscal revenue,
which would promote the equalization of county GHE per
capita.
The regions that are undeveloped or have limited fiscal
revenue usually have more rural residents, so they can
acquire more NCMS subsidies to achieve a faster in-
crease of county GHE per capita. Urbanization contrib-
utes to the reduction of the county GHE per capita
disparity, reflecting the long-term dispersed health
policies towards rural residents in China. The ongoing
large-scale urbanization and population migration will
continue to facilitate the narrowing of the county GHE
per capita disparity by decreasing the number of rural
residents [26].
The variables on the supply-side have the most signifi-
cant effect on reducing county GHE per capita dispar-
ities. This indicates that the NCMS subsidy policy first
considers the government’s financial capacity, rather
than the demands of the population’s health. The alloca-
tion formula for the capitation subsidy method should
be improved according to both supply-side and demand-
side factors in order to allocate NCMS funds more
Table 3 Regression results of β-convergence
Delta GHE (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GHE −0.0988*** −0.2410*** −0.3550*** −0.5450***
(0.0057) (0.0099) (0.0103) (0.0157)
Log general revenue 0.0324*** 0.0789***
(0.0072) (0.0131)








Population density 0.000002* 0.000005***
0.0000 0.0000






Constant 0.2540*** −0.1210*** 0.9300*** 0.3530***
(0.0088) (0.0235) (0.0151) (0.0405)
N 7764 7764 1941 1941
R-squared 0.0374 0.0868 0.3805 0.5158
Note: Each column represents a regression based on equation (3). Column (1)
and (2) test the short-term β-convergence (k = 1), and Column (3) and (4) test
the long-term β-convergence (k = 4). *, *** is significant at 5 %, 0.1 %, respect-
ively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Model (1) and (3) are estimated by
univariate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Model (2) and (4) are esti-
mated by multivariate General Least Square (GLS) and OLS method, respect-
ively (Stata 11 software). GHE is the abbreviation of government
health expenditure
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Table 4 Regression results of β-convergence in three regions of China
Delta Per GHE Western region Central region Eastern region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GHE −0.0883c −0.2370c −0.3240c −0.5170c −0.1290c −0.2620c −0.4330c −0.6220c −0.0944c −0.2570c −0.3530c −0.5730c
(0.0086) (0.0145) (0.0154) (0.0242) (0.0146) (0.0231) (0.0260) (0.0319) (0.0091) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0286)
Log general revenue −0.0012 0.0251 0.0381 0.2170c 0.0949c 0.1630c
(0.0097) (0.0193) (0.0204) (0.0390) (0.0137) (0.0240)
Log grants to county government 0.2200c 0.2870c 0.2040c 0.2680c 0.1780c 0.2500c
(0.0149) (0.0252) (0.0269) (0.0449) (0.0169) (0.0284)
Log Transfer to superior government −0.0139c 0.0010 0.0027 −0.0291 −0.0485c −0.0673c
(0.0042) (0.0069) (0.0106) (0.0152) (0.0070) (0.0130)
Population density 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000003 0.000002a 0.000007c
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Sex ratio −0.0098 0.0012 −0.0051 0.1800 0.0003 0.2080
(0.0114) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.1475) (0.0083) (0.1121)
Ratio of non-agriculture population −0.0021 −0.1780c −0.0135 −0.2390c −0.0307a −0.1980c
(0.0123) (0.0261) (0.0153) (0.0360) (0.0123) (0.0207)
Constant 0.2410c −0.1110b 0.8940c 0.4000c 0.2980c −0.1370a 1.0350c 0.0182 0.2430c −0.1460c 0.9100c 0.1230
(0.0137) (0.0349) (0.0234) (0.0602) (0.0206) (0.0632) (0.0342) (0.1859) (0.0143) (0.0376) (0.0261) (0.1345)
N 3156 3156 789 789 1988 1988 497 497 2620 2620 655 655
R-squared 0.0325 0.1017 0.3610 0.4950 0.0381 0.0707 0.3580 0.5098 0.0393 0.0988 0.3850 0.5450
Each column represents a regression based on equation (3) in three regions. Column (1) and (2) tests the short-term β-convergence (k = 1), and Column (3) and (4) tests the long-term β-convergence (k = 4) in three
regions. a, b, c is significant at 5 %, 1 %, 0.1 %, respectively. Standard error is in parentheses. Model (1) and (3) are estimated by univariate Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Model (2) and (4) are estimated by














equitably. Nothing but equitable allocation of GHE
across counties can lead to the realization of universal
health coverage.
The long-term and short-term convergence of county
GHE per capita exists on both the regional and national
levels, and the capitation subsidy method also has
improved intra-regional equity. In the Western regions,
general revenues of most counties are comparatively
low. Therefore, the county governments generally
accomplish their policy standards, and few of them are
willing to invest more to reduce the county GHE per
capita disparity. In contrast, in the Central and Eastern
regions, the richer county governments have the willing-
ness and fiscal capacity to invest more. This causes
larger county GHE per capita disparities. One factor
may cause multiple effects in different regions. This
implies the complexity of the implementation of the
NCMS policy. To achieve equity in county GHE per
capita, we need to explore the mechanisms of health
policy implementation in various regions.
This paper has some limitations. First of all, the ultim-
ate objective of the convergence of GHE per capita is to
improve residents’ healthcare utilization and health
outcomes. However, due to space limitations, we have
focused on the effectiveness of capitation subsidy
methods on the equity of GHE and its influencing
factors. More efforts should be conducted to explore
how the equalization of GHE per capita influences
healthcare utilization and health outcomes. Secondly,
although fund flows between county government, pre-
fecture government, provincial government and central
government (including transfers from county govern-
ments to superior governments and grants from superior
governments to county governments) are also an im-
portant topic to clarify, the subsidy institutions and
health programs in different provinces are complicated
and diverse. This paper has clarified the transfer pay-
ment relationship by way of example within a limited
space. Further research should discuss the roles and
mechanism of health fund flows between different levels
of government.
Conclusion
Universal health coverage requires equitable distribution
of GHE to each county. The capitation subsidy method
has proven effective in improving the equity of regional
GHE. China established the NCMS scheme in 2003 and
since then has used the capitation subsidy method to
distribute public funds to NCMS funds in counties. The
analysis of county GHE data (2003–07) verified the ex-
istence of σ-convergence and short-term and long-term
β-convergence at the national level. It has been shown
that the capitation subsidy method used in NCMS has
rapidly reduced county GHE per capita disparities, and
has improved county equity.
Transfers to higher level governments and a decreas-
ing agricultural population has reduced the county GHE
per capita disparities. Meanwhile, general revenues and
grants from higher level governments exert the opposite
effect. China’s present capitation subsidy method merely
considers supply-side factors, but neglects the effects of
demand-side factors. The factors contributing to the
convergence of county GHE per capita are different in
the three regions, which indicate the existence of differ-
ent implementation mechanisms for NCMS policy.
Endnotes
1In this paper, county refers to county-level units
including counties, autonomous counties, county-level
cities, qi, autonomous qi, and districts.
2Based on Local Fiscal Final Accounts (di fang cai zheng
zong jue suan) (2003–2007), the data in Provinces, Prefec-
tures and Counties Fiscal Statistical Yearbook (2003–2007)
was collected, calculated, and aggregated. Furthermore,
the data in Local Fiscal Final Accounts originated from
the local government’s routine record of fiscal revenue
and expenditure.
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